Sustainable Tourism Law

146 SUSTAINABLE TOURISM LAW shown by territorial reality, but also to capture the attention of visitors by applying constructive methods for the evolution of the town planning (accessibility and effectiveness), and by offering better conditions for public usability of the heritage. This is a goal that can be achieved through the use of channels of dissemination, information and knowledge that re-qualify the territory with new forms of integration, but also through appropriate planning and building upgrading projects aimed at verifying the presence of the requisites needed for the achievement of this newway of doing tourism. It is no coincidence, in that regard, that the analysis suggested in a socioeconomic key 24 uses the economic instrument to evaluate the incentive/disincentive capacity of the norm on the community, by stipulating the traditional definition of law as a set of precepts and by seeking internal forms (also through economic schemes under the law) of integration, for the identification of strategic outcomes, which are able to guarantee the actual achievement of the goals that society establishes for itself through the processes of finding collective choices. Consequently, the key concept, usable in the perspective outlined, is that of efficiency 25 , that is to say, a 24 The bibliography is vast. Reference is made, without exaggeration, M. ABRESCIA, Governare la differenziazione. L’analisi economica del diritto ed il nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione, in Mercato Concorrenziale e regole , n. 1, 2003; G. ALPA – F. PULITINI- S. RODOTA’- F. ROMANI (a cura di), Interpretazione giuridica ed analisi economica , Milano, 1982; R. COOTER, P. G. MATTEI – U. MONATERI – R. PARDOLESI – T. ULEN, Il mercato delle regole. Analisi economica del diritto civile, in Collana strumenti , Il Mulino, Bologna, 1999; F. DENOZZA, Norma efficienti. L’analisi economica delle norme giuridiche , Giuffrè, Milano, 2002; L A. FRANZONI, Introduzione all’economica del diritto , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003; G. BELLANTUONO, Razionalità limitata e regole contrattuali: promesse e problemi della nuova analisi economica del diritto , LIUC Papers n. 94, supplemento a ottobre 2001, Etica, diritto ed economia , 4; M. D’ANTONI , L’analisi economica del contenzioso civile, in Politica del diritto , vol. 26, 2005, pp. 327-50; D. FRIEDMAN, L’ordine del diritto. Perché l’analisi economica può servire al diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004; R. PARDOLESI – A. ARCURI, voce Analisi economica del diritto, in Enciclopedia del diritto , Agg. Vol. VI, Giuffrè, Milano, 2002, p. 7 ss.; R. BOWLES, Diritto ed economia , Bologna, 1985; R. H. COASE, Impresa, mercato e diritto , Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995; D. FABBRI- G. FIORENTINI-L. A. FRANZONI (a cura di), L’analisi economica del diritto, Carocci, Roma, 1998; E. ROSSI (a cura di), L’analisi economica del diritto: banche, società e mercati , Cacucci, Bari, 2004; S. SHAVELL, Fondamenti dell’analisi economica del diritto , Giappichelli, Torino, 2005; L. A. FRANZONI, Introduzione all’economia del diritto , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003; G. CALABRESI, Costo degli incidenti e responsabilità civile. Analisi economico-giuridica , Trad. it., Milano, 1975; G. S. BECKER, L’approccio economico al comportamento umano , Il Mulino, Bologna, 1988; R. A, POSNER, Ecoomic Analisys of Law, Little, Brown & co., Boston/Toronto , 1986. 25 “ In terms of economic analysis of law, there are three types of efficiency criteria: Pareto optimality, Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. In them, the basic notion of efficiency understood as the optimal input and output combination combines with the microeconomic theory of market equilibrium. According to Pareto optimality, a certain allocation of resources is efficient (or optimal) unless another allocation of resources is available so that at least one individual is better than before and no other individual is worse than before. According to the Pareto superiority thesis, a given resource allocation is superior (or Pareto-superior) to another resource allocation if at least one individual is better than before and no other individual is better than before. According to Kaldor-Hicks thesis, a certain allocation of resources is more efficient than the other allocation of resources if some individuals are better than before, some individuals are worse than before, and those who benefit from the changes can indemnify the damaged while remaining in better condition than the previous one (or at least under the same conditions as before) ”. On this topic, C. GARBARINO, La tutela giustiziale con accordi tra fisco e contribuente: analisi economica del diritto e comparazione , in Riv. dir. fin., n. 3/2001, p. 235-6.