Wine Law

33 Years later, and after the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this Galicia’s regulation of was delivered, Botana and Maroño showed their approval of this norm and though it praiseworthy that the Court might have given the green light to the extension to the range of designations of origin. They affirmed, unreservedly and unconditionally, that “the designation of origin is a legal instrument apt to protect products other than agricultural and food” and mentioned — as “contestants” to qualify for the status — certain “Spanish protected designations” in foreign countries by virtue of bilateral agreements: embroidery from Lagartera, leather products from Ubrique, carpets from Alpujarra, knives from Albacete, etc. “That no designation of origin yet —they conclude — may have recognised in our country for these products should not be a compelling argument for precluding future discussions along these lines” 44 . Over time, mentor and pupil will part their ways in their research through the works mentioned above. However, neither ever subscribed to such overarching concepts as those they had both held in 1991. Let us look into that. Botana, in 2001, will categorically reject the designation of origin status when applied to products to which he had recognised it earlier on (he only mentions leather products from Ubrique, though) 45 . When examining the Galicia’s Act, while demanding as a precondition for the passing of it “the absence of narrow-minded obstacles to extend the designation of origin to products other than agricultural or food”, he holds back from praising the wording of the Act 46 or the endorsement by the Constitutional Court. Maroño, in 2002, agrees with the Constitutional Court that the institution of the designation of origin status should not be defined by its scope but rather by the double connection. He concedes, however, the latter conditions the former, and in so doing he admits its application to marble or stones — as long as its nature its due to the 44 BOTANA AGRA, M. J., & MAROÑO GARGALLO, M. M. (1991-2), “Las piedras ornamentales como objeto protegible por denominación de origen (Comentario a la sentencia 211/1990, de 20 de diciembre, del Tribunal Constitucional”, Actas de Derecho Industrial y Derecho de Autor , nº 14, p. 208. 45 Las denominaciones de origen, ibid, p. 83. 46 Indeed, he warns that Galicia’s lawmakers artfully resorted to the phrase “for the purpose of this Act” when defining its institution. It is evident that this is fallacious because “the purpose of this Act” targets stones from Galicia, while bestowing them with a commercial advantage which the stones from other geographical areas do not have.